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This paper is an analysis of the current state of Nakhi minority culture as practiced 
by Nakhi women living in the city of Lijiang and its surrounding areas. This analysis 
presents a historical assessment of the cultural, economic, historical, and political 
factors that have lead to the creation of the Lijiang Old Town that we see today and 
the current state of Nakhi culture surrounding that development. As well, this paper 
presents a field assessment of the current state of Nakhi cultural practice in light of 
the internalized discourses of the Chinese state and the indigenous discourses of the 
Nakhi people, especially those related to the gendering and spatializtaion of Nakhi 
authenticity. This study was conducted using a qualitative interview methodology that 
entailed interviews of Nakhi women, the representatives of Nakhi culture in China 
and abroad, across generations and across Nakhi space to better understand Nakhi 
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When I first entered the city of Lijiang in the summer of 2008, driving down 
the wide boulevards of New Town lined with apartment blocks, restaurants frying 
various Chinese cuisines, and an imposing statue of Mao Zedong clad in the simple 
clothes of the Revolution, hailing the Chinese people, I thought Lijiang was much 
like any other Chinese metropolis. However, just south of the effigy of the Chairman, 
I discovered a place that is still, even after this month of dedicated study, 
4 
simultaneously the most alluring part of the city of Lijiang and the most perplexing. 
This place is Lijiang Old Town (Lijiang Gucheng.) The five-word sentence that I 
most often heard associated with the purportedly ancient Old Town from the city’s 
expatriates, Han Chinese tourists and store owners, and even a handful of the local 
Nakhi
1
 minority people who call Lijiang their home and cultural center was, simply 
put, “This is Chinese Disney Land,”  
And, unfortunately, this assessment is not far off the mark. Ever since a 
devastating earthquake in 1996, Lijiang Old Town has been developing exponentially 
into a tourist destination that attracts droves, numbering in the millions, of tourists 
annually from within China and from around the world. Foreign hotel corporations, 
fast food chains, like the KFC, Pizza Hut, and McDonalds franchises that are 
prominently placed at the entrance to the Old Town, their names emblazoned in 
Nakhi Dongba pictographic script and various and sundry small businesses peddling 
goods that are at best loosely related to the traditions of the Nakhi have all but 
overtaken the entirety of the Old Town. However, along with this explosion of capital 
inflows and tourist traffic, the Nakhi minority has experienced displacement, although 
mostly voluntary, from the Old Town that was once their own as well as cultural 
changes that are immediately apparent even when only taking a short stroll down Old 
Town’s crowded Sifang Jie (Square Street.) 
                                                 
1
 I have chosen to use the spelling “Nakhi” instead of the Chinese pinyin spelling 
“Naxi” in this paper because the pinyin spelling refers to the state’s politicized 
category created under the minzu shibie in 1954, not the ethnic identity. The political 
category, illogically, also includes the Moso, the Lolo, and even certain Han groups 
who consider themselves to be distinct from the label “Naxi” (See Chao 2008) As 
well, most Nakhi people I encountered used the former not the latter when using a 
Romanization to describe themselves. 
5 
Observing how Lijiang’s Old Town has been transformed from a bustling 
trading center on the famed Tea Horse Caravan Road and the economic and cultural 
center of the former Nakhi Kingdom of the Mu Family to what some would call a 
tourist trap and what others would call a Chinese entrepreneur’s dream begs the 
question: How exactly did Old Town happen? In my time this month in and around 
Lijiang Old Town, I strove to understand the people and the power relationships at 
the core of this metamorphosis, and the answers I unearthed were surprising. When I 
first came to Lijiang, I was tempted, as many Western visitors to Lijiang are, to 
conclude that a place like Lijiang, being as exploitative of a small, relatively 
traditional culture as it undeniably is, could only arise through a predatory 
relationship between the powerful, Han majority state and a weak, underrepresented 
Nakhi minority who are subject to the whims of the Chinese Communist Party and 
the market. However, this assumption was fundamentally shaken by my readings 
about and conversations with Nakhi people. Due to historical and cultural factors, the 
Nakhi have been complicit in, if not at the forefront of, this rebirth and repurposing of 
Lijiang’s Old Town and the subsequent reshaping of their own culture.  
In order to better understand these shifts that Nakhi society has undergone in 
the wake of Lijiang’s development, I decided that speaking to the people who have 
become the representatives of Nakhi culture to the Chinese populous and to the 
international community as a whole would be the best method of conceptualizing the 
more drastic changes in Nakhi cultural expression and cultural practice. Those people 
are Nakhi women. Nakhi women have been a fascination of ethnographic and gender 
researchers since the days of Joseph Rock and Peter Goullart due to these women’s 
6 
well-known economic power within their families, their deeply engrained work ethic, 
and their physical sturdiness relative to Nakhi men because of years of ceaseless labor. 
Nakhi women are truly powerful beings, and, as a result of that strength and of 
discursive processes of gendered Nakhi authenticity, they have become, in some ways, 
the symbolic vanguards of their own culture today. 
 I talked to and interviewed women across different generations and in 
different locations inside of and surrounding Lijiang in order to grasp the effects of 
development on Nakhi women and, by default, Nakhi society as a whole over time, as 
well as over space. Leaving Lijiang was critical to my research as the spatialization of 
development and investment related to the Old Town is heavily centralized, 
imbalanced, and not well distributed within Nakhi society. This has actually been a 
thread throughout Nakhi history with Lijiang being a trading post and waypoint on 
the Tea Horse Caravan Road, which will be discussed later. However, despite the 
somewhat poor dispersal of the benefits of development, I was able to unearth clear 
themes in Nakhi women’s attitudes towards Lijiang’s specific brand of development 
and cultural change that were indicative of the cultural effects of Lijiang’s 
mushrooming growth and also indicative of the possible futures of Lijiang. These 
interviews also revealed the Chinese state and indigenous Nakhi discourses about 
cultural evolution and cultural preservation that are at work in the minds of Nakhi 
people in and around Lijiang that have additionally contributed to the reshaping of 
Nakhi identity.  
Through my discussions with Nakhi women and other people in the 
communities of Lijiang, I have come to understand Lijiang in a far different way than 
I did previously. The tourism-oriented development of the Old Town is not a result of 
7 
state imposition on a less powerful minority group, nor is it purely the result of 
inexorable market forces overpowering cultural forces and values. The current state 
of Lijiang and its surrounding areas are more so an outcome of Nakhi history, Nakhi 
economic sensibilities, and Nakhi cultural factors, all of which will be discussed 
within the pages of this analysis. The Nakhi have internalized Chinese state 
discourses and created their own discourses, which have led to the chosen method of 
cultural preservation and modernization within Lijiang that is highly selective and 
market-oriented in some ways and more geared towards the preservation of deep-
rooted Nakhi values in others. As stated above, Lijiang is a perplexing place, as 
intriguing as it is complex, and in this paper I will endeavor to demystify its 
multilayered complexities. I will do this while trying my utmost to do justice to the 
depth of insight that the many fascinating, noble Nakhi women who played the role of 
my informants in this process have revealed to me. The Nakhi people have given me 
a great deal, and I hope to give back to them by providing all who read this piece 
deeper understanding of Nakhi culture as it stands today. 
 
Ancient History of the Lijiang Nakhi (Pre-History-Qing Dynasty) 
 
 Before turning to the current situation of the Nakhi people in and around 
Lijiang, it will be important for the purposes of this analysis to take a deep dive into 
the history of the Nakhi so as to understand the socio-historical, economic, and 
cultural factors that have created the Lijiang that exists today. The Nakhi, like certain 
Tibetan groups, the Bai people, and the Moso people, are direct descendents of the 
Qiang nomadic herding tribes, a group considered barbarians and enemies of the state 
8 
by the Chinese empire as early as the Shang Dynasty.
2
 According to Sydney White, 
the Qiang groups who would later be known as the Nakhi began migrating south from 
the Qiang tribes’ home in the Qinghai Plateau about 1,400 years ago during the reign 
of the Tang dynasty, which lasted from 618 C.E. until 907 C.E.
3
 However, Pedro 
Ceinos Arcones argues that the Qiang began a long, drawn out process of migration 
south from their herding grounds in the grasslands of the Qinghai Plateau beginning 
as early as 4,000 years ago, and the Nakhi’s ancestors were perhaps a part of one of 
the later waves of southward movement.
4
 Arcones also logically asserts that,“ The 
Naxi nationality is the result of the blending of different races and peoples, including 
aboriginal populations from northwest Yunnan, waves of Qiang migrants, tribes of 
Tibetan stock, and individuals of Mongolian, Bai, and Chinese origin,” making sure 
to emphasize the importance of the heavily intertwined nature of most, if not all, 
ethnicities in northwest Yunnan and southwestern China in general.
5
 
 I was exposed to many separate accounts of how the Nakhi came to be settled 
in the fertile Lijiang basin, in the shadow of the Jade Dragon Snow Mountain, a 
mountain that still holds spiritual and ceremonial significance for the Nakhi living in 
and around Lijiang; many consider the mountain itself to be a god or animated with 
spirits of the Nakhi Dongba religion. Many scholars and Nakhi people claim that 
Lijiang was the original settling place of their Qiang ancestors and that the Lijiang 
basin is not only the beating heart of Nakhi economic life and the seat of Nakhi 
                                                 
2
 Arcones, Pedro Ceinos. Sons of Heaven, Brothers of Nature: The Naxi of Southwest 
China. Papers of the White Dragon: Kunming, China. 2012: 44. 
3
 White, Sydney D. “Fame and Sacrifice: The Gendered Construction of Naxi 
Identities.” Modern China, Vol. 23, No. 3. July 2007: 300. 
4
 Arcones 2012: 45. 
5
 Ibid, 43. 
9 
political power, but also the starting point and origin of Nakhi culture. However, that 
last point is often contested among Nakhi people, especially in the areas surrounding 
Lijiang. One twenty five year old half-Nakhi, half-Bai informant from Qiao Tou, the 
town at the end of Tiger Leaping Gorge closest to Lijiang told me that his father told 
him Nakhi histories that say otherwise. He claimed that Sanba and it’s mystical 
geological formation, Baishuitai, as the origin of Dongba (dongba de fa yuan di,) was 
the true seat of Nakhi culture, citing his status as an eleventh generation Nakhi man 
on his father’s side and traceable roots to the Qiang as his credentials. He claimed that 
a war called the White and Black War between the Nakhi and another group had 
caused many wealthy Nakhi to flee from the area surrounding Sanba and Zhongdian 
(Shangri-la) to the Lijiang basin and settle there permanently as a result of the basin’s 
fertile soil and holy positioning at the foot of the mountain.
6
 Similarly, in a 
conversation that I had with a Nakhi music teacher at a primary school in Baisha, the 
teacher claimed that because Baisha had produced its own form of Nakhi music, 
much older and authentically Nakhi than the Han classical style played by Mr. Xuan 
Ke’s famous Nakhi Ancient Music Orchestra in Old Town, Baisha should be 
considered “the center of Nakhi culture, of our most ancient culture.”
7
 This 
disagreement on the true location of the origin of Nakhi traditional culture begins to 
elucidate Nakhi discourses of authenticity that will be discussed later in this paper.  
 However, despite this debate regarding the original settling place of the Nakhi 
and the birthplace of Nakhi-ness, Lijiang and Dayanzhen, the area now most 
commonly known as Lijiang Old Town, was undeniably the “historical and political 
                                                 
6
 Male Nakhi –Bai baoche driver in a discussion with the author, May 2013. 
7
 Male Baisha music teacher in a discussion with the author, May 2013.  
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heartland” for the Nakhi people.
8
 Dayanzhen sits at the center of the Lijiang basin 
and was home to Nakhi political powers and states of different forms. During the 
sixth and seventh centuries C.E., the Nakhi established a “statelet” that was the first 
of any discernable “historical relevance” that was founded by Nakhi-Qiang chieftains 
who were supposedly endowed with magical abilities and a connection to the spirit 
world, similar to that of a Dongba. 
9
 This statelet and those that followed after were 
“[g]eographically sandwiched between the powerful non-Chinese Nanzhao state in 
the Dali basin to the south, the periodically powerful Tibetans in the mountains to the 
northwest, and the raid-prone Yi…peoples in the mountains to the northeast” making 
the Nakhi “quite conscious…of their relatively small population and consequent 
vulnerability.”
10
 The Nakhi were very adaptable to new power dynamics as a result 
of their positioning “between some of the most powerful empires of Aisa,” and thus 
possess, and arguably still do possess, “an astonishing ability to integrate foreign 
influences into their lives” and into their own culture, at least those that worked to 
their advantage and aided in their survival among military and economic giants.
11
  
An apt example of the skill with which the Nakhi can adapt to power shifts 
and cultural changes came with the decline of the Nanzhao Kingdom. The Nakhi 
people had remained subservient to the Nanzhao Kingdom of their neighboring Bai 
people, living as simple, tribal Yak herders until the overthrow of the Nanzhao in 902 
C.E. by a “palatial rebellion.”
12
 A ruling clan called Yang within the Nakhi fell out of 
power and favor due to their connections with the Nanzhao Kingdom, allowing the 
                                                 
8
 White 2007: 300. 
9
 Arcones 2012: 46. 
10
 White 2007: 300-301. 
11
 Arcones 2012: 43. 
12
 Ibid, 51. 
11 
famous Mu family to become the leaders of a newly created Nakhi state. Then, with 
the arrival of Kublai Khan and a massive Mongolian army, his eyes set on the 
Nanzhao capital of Dali, in 1253, the Mu family sided with the Mongolians, giving 
the Mongolians access to the best mountain paths that could allow them to descend 
upon Dali without having to attempt to bypass the all but impassible natural boundary 
of Erhai Lake. The Nakhi had known the “Mongol custom of exterminating those 
who opposed them and reward[ing] those who help them” and that the Mongolians 
would eventually use their new positioning in Dali to attack the ever-encroaching 
Song Dynasty, so they welcomed the Mongolians with open arms, adapting perfectly 
to the situation for their own benefit.
13
  
This Nakhi talent for adaptation and cultural adjustments continued under Mu 
family. The Mu Kingdom gained control of the Lijiang basin from the Pumi people, 
allowing the Nakhi to settle permanently in the area around Lijiang and Baisha and to 
make a shift from a nomadic herding lifestyle to a static, agricultural mode of 
existence.
14
 This allowed for the creation of wealth, of a more static culture, and of a 
political presence for the Nakhi, a presence that would not go unnoticed by the 
Chinese empire. The Nakhi Kingdom entered into a tributary relationship with the 
Mongolian Yuan Dynasty (C.E. 1206-1368) under the tusi system of self-governance 
with the Mu family being the contact between the Chinese empire and the Nakhi 
people.
15
 Despite the fact that “Chinese rule was nominal only”
16
 at this time, with 
power still resting with the Nakhi chiefs and the Mu, this change in the system of 
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 White 2007: 301. 
16
 Arcones 2012: 58. 
12 
government brought about a class system that was “two-tiered” and comprised of 
“elites and commoners.” 
17
 Such a system had never been formalized in Nakhi 
society prior to the entrance into the tusi arrangement. This was the first sign of Nakhi 
absorption of Chinese imperial values. 
Chinese soldiers began to migrate south to Lijiang during the Ming (C.E. 
1368-1644) and Qing (C.E.1644-1911) dynasties, likely to bolster the Chinese 
Empire’s administration of imperial governance in the area, facilitating the Nakhi 
people’s “[e]xposure to the influence of Chinese culture” mostly due to intermarriage 
between the Chinese soldiers and Nakhi women.
18
 Lijiang and the Nakhi people were, 
however, not “formally incorporated into the Chinese [E]mpire [until] 1723” under a 
system called gaitu guiliu, or “regular government.”
19
 In a conversation with two 
docents at a museum dedicated to a famous, local scholar, one of the first to study 
Dongba pictographic script, the female docent informed me that she considers gaitu 
guiliu to be the time period when the Nakhi common people began to accept Han 
Chinese influence of their own volition, not just Nakhi elites. “It was a very open 
time (hen kai fang de shi dai.) Before 1723, if you didn’t speak Nakhi language, then 
you couldn’t come to Lijiang.” She also went on to say that pre-gaitu guiliu Nakhi 
culture is “not remembered today and barely understood by most people,” perhaps 
with the exception of surviving ancient Dongba ritual practices.
20
  
The Nakhi truly have been so integrated with the culture of the Han Chinese 
that their culture and ceremonies are nearly indistinguishable from those of the Han in 
                                                 
17






 Female docent (museum in Old Town) in conversation with the author. May 2013.  
13 
Lijiang and its surrounding areas. White comments on this Nakhi cultural shift by 
stating that despite the numerous cultural influences that have been infused with 
Nakhi culture, from Chan and Nyingmapa Buddhism to Daoism to the clear influence 
of Tibetan Bon on the practice of Dongba, there is an ever present and “unmistakable 
legacy of Confucian practices despite widespread stereotypes…that [the] Lijiang 
Naxi are ‘matriarchal’” and matrilineal.
21
 Not only Confucian popular practice such 
as Confucian ceremonies and Han ancestor worship made their way into the Nakhi 
understanding of their own culture, but “Nakhi social organization, particularly 
gender practices,” were fundamentally restructured post-gaitu guiliu.
22
 White goes on 
to note that Chinese norms with regards to kinship and marriage such as “[p]atrilineal 
descent, ancestor veneration, and clan exogamy,
23
 along with patrilocal residence” as 
well as the pre-Liberation practices of arranged marriages and “nonpatrilineally 
related cousin marriages” were all commonly practiced Confucian traditions within 
Nakhi society after 1723.
24
 Nakhi women, after 1723 and prior to 1949, also 
experienced the same limited social status as Han Chinese women and were viewed 
as dirty, lowly beings compared to their upstanding, cultured male counterparts.  
Thus began the mostly voluntary assimilation of the Nakhi into Chinese 
culture, much earlier and far less coerced than I had initially anticipated with my 
uneducated observations of Lijiang Old Town. The Nakhi’s historical positioning, 
raising a small kingdom among the great empires of Asia, engrained the Nakhi with 
                                                 
21




 Clan exogamy is the practice of marrying outside one’s own community, tribe, or, 
in this case, one’s own clan. This means that daughters would have been married off 
to families in other Nakhi groups than her own family, likely to ensure genetic health 
of children. 
24
 White 2007: 301-302. 
14 
the value of situational acculturation. By necessity, the Nakhi made themselves 
people who are ready to shape their culture and practices to the changing conditions 
of history as well as to the ebbs and flows of the political and economic status quo, so 
as to ensure their own survival as a people. The Nakhi were not forced to change, 
they adopted a more Han way of life in order to be in the good graces of Chinese 
imperial forces, to improve their own lives, and to be seen by such forces as a 
civilized, respectable people. This is not to say that the transition was smooth for all 
Nakhi people. For example, many young Nakhi lovers who were forced into arranged 
marriages would commit suicide in protest at places like Jade Dragon Snow Mountain 
as well as a peak closer to Lashi Hai where one informant that lovers would jump to 
their death to avoid such marriages. However, compared with other minorities of 




Modern History of the Lijiang Nakhi (1911-1978) 
  
 The Chinese Empire held the Nakhi in high esteem until the collapse of the 
Qing Dynasty as a result of the Republican Revolution of 1911. However, the Nakhi 
would soon need to adapt yet again. The Republican government began to create 
assimilationist plans so as to sure up the Chinese nation under one Marxist-Leninist-
Maoist vanguard Party, one government, one mother national tongue, and one 
national culture at the direction of Dr. Sun Yat Sen and other Republican 
revolutionary thinkers. In 1912, at the behest of the national government and under 
the guidance of these plans for uniting China, the county government of Lijiang 
“organized a Chinese Language Society to teach Naxi men Chinese language” and a 
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 Male Nakhi horse riding tour guide in a discussion with the author. May 2013. 
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policy was made stating that any Nakhi man caught speaking his native tongue 
“would be fined one copper coin.”
26
 This was not only the beginning of Nakhi 
assimilation into the Chinese nation state, but also the beginning of the drawing of 
much more distinct gender lines between Nakhi men and Nakhi women in terms of 
cultural practice and, later, Nakhi cultural authenticity.  
 After the 1927 purge of the Communists from the Guomindang in Shanghai, 
many Nakhi joined the ranks of the underground Communists movement. White 
claims that “some local estimates run as high as 90%” of the Nakhi population had 
direct involvement with the Communists just before Liberation in 1949 in 
“a…strategic move to jump on the [powerful] bandwagon of the obviously soon-to-
be-victorious Communists”.
27
 While this number is undoubtedly an overestimation, 
the fact that it is subject to such magnification shows that political participation and 
loyalty to the right cause is a point of pride for the Nakhi. White also confirms that 
the Nakhi’s history of “being enmeshed between powerful empires has [perhaps] 
contributed to this ethos” of adhering to the political, social, and economic status 
quo.
28
 The Nakhi also participated directly in the War of Japanese Resistance after 
the 1936 Japanese capture of the Chinese Republican capital of Nanjing. The Tea 
Horse Caravan Road and the Nakhi’s role in the trading on the road was revived as an 
important trade route between India and Tibet, so “Lijiang became a prosperous city 
where banks and commercial enterprises were established and goods were forwarded 
to Dali and the rest of China.”
29
 Baisha also became an important waypoint for the 
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 Arcones 2012: 67. 
27




 Arcones 2012: 67. 
16 
American Air Force’s volunteer group, affectionately called the “Flying Tigers” by 
the Chinese and the Nakhi, with General Joseph Stillwell’s construction of the Baisha 
airport, just ten kilometers to the north of Dayanzhen.
30
 This allowed the aerial 
transportation of military supplies from India over the formidable boundary of the 
Himalayas to the Chinese military and ensured Chinese victory over the Japanese 
invaders in China’s southwest.  
 This skillful maneuvering during the Second World War and the Liberation 
won the Nakhi a place of respect in the eyes of the Communist Party of China and the 
Chinese people. As White relates,“ The Central government views the Naxi as being 
both a ‘relatively advanced’ (bijiao fada) and…‘obedient’ (tinghua) national 
minority” both as a result of their service of the nation and their relatively high level 
of assimilation into Han Chinese society.
31
 Emily Chao goes so far as to assert that 
Naxi scholars, specifically those located in the Lijiang basin and Lijiang Old Town, 
have attempted to “represent themselves as somehow outside the category of Naxi” 
venturing to be viewed as a “‘sinicized’ [(han hua)] ethnic minority” and to “[contest] 
their [political] categorization as non-Chinese.”
32
 
 In the Mao Era following, the Second World War and the Liberation of 1949, 
the Nakhi of Lijiang made additional strides to assert their firm position as members 
of the newly created Chinese communist state. According to White’s understanding 
of the political situation in Lijiang during the Five Year Plans immediately following 
                                                 
30
 Ibid, 67-68.  
31
 White 2007: 302.  
32
 Chao, Emily. “Hegemony, Agecy, and Re-presenting the Past: The Invention of 
Dongba Culture among the Naxi of Southwest China.” Negotiating Ethnicities in 
China and Taiwain. Pgs. 208-239. Institute of East Asian Studies. Berkley, CA. 1996. 
232. 
17 
Liberation and well into the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s the Nakhi 
were “known for their zealousness in demonstrating adherence to the Communist 
Party status quo.” 
33
Actions such as redistributing land twice and ascribing class 
labels to the citizenry of Lijiang twice demonstrate this zealousness quite nicely. 
White goes on to say “ Han from Kunming who were ‘sent down to the countryside’ 
to Lijiang during the Cultural Revolution testify to the political excesses (even by 
Cultural Revolution standards) of the basin area,” and that the saying “Even before 
Beijing has made a move, Lijiang has already started (Beijing hai mei dong, Lijiang 
yijing kashi le,)” became a common turn of phrase when referring to the political 
swiftness of the Nakhi.
34
  
There are even vast amounts of evidence to suggest that the Nakhi used this 
zeal for maintaining the state’s political status quo to their own customs. According to 
my male informant in Qiao Tou, an elderly female informant in Haba, as well as the 
music teacher from Baisha and his Nakhi language teacher compatriot, the Cultural 
Revolution was a dark time of decline for the ritual practice of Dongba and other 
aspects of Nakhi culture. The driver from Qiao Tou mentioned that Dongba went 
underground in Sanba during the Cultural Revolution and that Dongba priests were 
no longer allowed to pass down their knowledge to their sons as tradition dictated, but 
many did so anyway in secret, even after being forced to burn their ritual manuscripts 
by Han and, presumably, Nakhi Red Guards.
35
 My elderly female informant from 
Haba village related to me how there used to be a Dongba with an abundance of 
Dongba ritual manuscripts written in Dongba pictographs. She even recalled Haba 
                                                 
33




 Male Nakhi-Bai baoche driver in a discussion with the author. May 2013.  
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having a Lubu, a long since disappeared female form of a Dongba priest (although, 
according to Chao, the ritual practices of these women, also known as Sanbas, more 
closely resembled shamanism,)
36
 as well as dancing to more traditional forms of 
Nakhi music with more traditional dance steps that have since been lost.
37
 According 
to the two teachers in Baisha village, “During the Mao Era, there was a policy against 
the study of Dongba pictographs and Nakhi language, but since Gaige Kaifang 
in1978, that policy has not been enforced.” 
38
 Due to the Nakhi’s zeal for political 
cooperation, many aspects of Nakhi history and culture were lost like seeds of 
tradition in a gust of Marxist and Morganian unilineal, evolutionist history, to the 
Chinese state’s and many pro-Socialist Nakhi people’s delight. 
I do not wish, however, to paint the Nakhi people as a group of lackeys to any 
and every powerful force that crosses their path; that would be an unfair and incorrect 
portrayal of a people who have a specialty in intelligent political maneuvering. One 
prime example of the Nakhi rejecting a powerful, yet disadvantageous, force can be 
seen in their patent refusal to convert to Christianity when missionaries arrived in 
Lijiang in the 1940s. These proselytizers had made inroads with converting Han 
Chinese, some Tibetans, as well as other ethnic minority groups in Yunnan, such as 
the Hmong, known to the Chinese state as the Miao. However, not only were the 
Nakhi sensibilities with regards to religion and belief “departmentalized…with each 
religion serving some particular need,” but they believed that “it was best not to take 
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chance on future joys but to enjoy oneself to the hilt whilst on this plane.”
39
 The 
Nakhi decided that their own religious and spiritual traditions had brought them 
success as they stood, and, therefore rebuffed the Christian missionaries as 
unnecessary and, perhaps, as politically dangerous with the coming revolution. The 
Nakhi were not just bandwagon hoppers, there was always a method to their 
adaptation. 
Nakhi Identity: Discourses of the State and Discourses of the Nakhi 
   
Throughout these manifold, historical transitions into Chinese imperial, Han 
Chinese, and Chinese national power relationships and cultures, the Nakhi people 
have internalized many state discourses regarding their own position within Chinese 
society, all the while creating their own discourses of difference within Nakhi society, 
especially with regards to the spatialization of and the gendered nature of Nakhi 
authenticity. Chinese imperial discourses regarding the Nakhi, prior to the entrance of 
the Mu family into the system of tusi, mostly considered the Nakhi, and most other 
non-Han groups, to be barbarian outsiders, and a sort of “civilizing project” of the 
Confucian Chinese Empire.
40
 Blake Stone-Banks explains the Confucian discourse of 
a hierarchy of peoples, which juxtaposed the Han Chinese and the proverbial others 
of China, such as the Nakhi, well by asserting the following: 
The most civilized people (e.g. the scholar-officials who served the imperial 
state) had the greatest knowledge of relevant literary works. Non-Chinese 
were the furthest down on the Confucian scale of civilization because they did 
non have even an indirect acquaintance with the moral principles defined in 
                                                 
39
 Goullart, Peter. The Forgotten Kingdom. John Murray Publishers Ltd. London, UK. 
1955. 84. 
40
 Stone-Banks, Blake. “The Minzu Shibie: Equality and Evolution in Early CCP 
Minority Research and Policy (Spring 2000.)” Ethnic Minority Issues in Yunnan. Pgs. 
48-69. Yunnan Fine Arts Publishing House. Kunming, China. 2004. 60-61. 
20 
the classics…[However,] [p]eople of other nationalities were not excluded 
from participating in the examination system or serving in China’s 
government. Finally the approach of the Confucian standard of civilization 
was that the civilized world (Confucian China) was involved in a process of 
making the raw (sheng) cultures of the world more civilized. Even the Han 
dynasty’s southern expansion involved great ‘sinification’ through 





The pre-Revolution Nakhi were assimilated into the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties 
under these very same Confucian principles of civilization, and, thus, according to 
their penchant for adeptly absorbing such cultural values, the Nakhi readily embraced 
this hierarchy of sheng cultures and the Han. Nakhi men, especially elites under the 
system of tusi, aggressively began making themselves models of Chinese culture and 
principle. Nakhi men all but abandoned their traditional dress (this dress can scarcely 
be seen being worn by men and only by those involved in the tourism industry in 
Lijiang today,) began adopting Han tastes in music, as evidenced by Xuan Ke’s 
famous Nakhi orchestra that replicates the musical stylings of ancient imperial court 
composers, and studying Nakhi culture as well as Confucian texts. Academic 
endeavors became, what White calls “avenues to fame,” fame being his 
conceptualization of the thirst for respect and admiration for which Nakhi men are 
well known. White even claims that simply affecting the manner, sophistication, and 
leisurely life of a Confucian scholar could gain even men of the lowest education and 
respect a certain amount of fame in his community.
 42
 Nakhi women, however, did 
not make these strides towards sinicization. Nakhi women, despite their stereotypical 
standing as providers, laborers, and the seat of family capital, were considered to be 
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of low social status. Peter Goullart, a Russian-born researcher who made the journey 
to Lijiang in the 1940s, explains,“ [Nakhi] [w]omen may not sit in the presence of 
men or eat together with them. Also women never sleep in the upper rooms or remain 
there long. They are considered traditionally unclean creatures and it is not right for 
them to walk above their men’s heads.”
43
 Nakhi women’s low status within their own 
culture, with the added “structural liminality” experienced by Han women prior to 
1949, prevented them from integrating fully into Han Chinese traditions, aside from 
the newly established gender and marriage norms mentioned above into which the 
Nakhi people as a whole assimilated after 1723.
44
 
 Peter Goullart’s famous work, The Forgotten Kingdom, is an invaluable 
resource for understanding Lijiang, the roles of Nakhi women, and the discourses at 
work in the lives of the Nakhi in the post-Republican Revolution and pre-Liberation 
eras due to his extensive research of Lijiang, alongside his more famous 
contemporary Joseph Rock, before being forced to leave the area in 1949. By the 
1940s, “the Confucian ethics [had] superseded and modified the original Nakhi 
customs, but a few of the latter still [persisted],” demonstrating the extent to which 
the Nakhi had become fully incorporated into dominant Chinese sensibilities.
45
 
Women’s status had been lowered in some ways with the expansion of practices such 
as bride selling and the disposal of widows; although Goullart notes that the latter 
practice was already in decline. However, Goullart, with a certain amount of romantic 
hyperbole, recounts how the legendary strength of the Nakhi women had elevated 
their status, at least in economic sectors: 
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Continuous manual work was the women’s lot. They did not revolt; they did 
not even protest. Instead, silently and persistently like the roots of growing 
trees, they slowly evolved themselves into a powerful race until they utterly 
enslaved their men. They learned all the intricacies of commerce and became 
merchants, land and exchange brokers, shopkeepers and traders. They 
encouraged their men to loaf, lounge, and to look after the babies. It is they 
who reaped the golden harvest of their enterprise, and their husbands and sons 
had to beg them for money, even if only a few pennies to buy cigarettes. It 
was the women who started courting men and they held them fast by the 
power of their money…Nothing could be obtained or bought in Likiang 
without women’s intervention…Tibetan caravans [headed due North to 
Kunming along the Tea Horse Caravan Road], on arrival, surrendered their 





Essentially, the Nakhi women of the Lijiang basin, having been excluded from the 
realms of culture and education associated with the high Han and Confucian culture, 
began dominating the sphere of economics and holding the role of traders with the 
Tibetans on the Tea Horse Caravan Road. This role gave Nakhi women immense 
power within their own community, power that Nakhi men could only envy. However, 
due to Nakhi women’s status as low, unclean beings and their persistent upholding of 
Nakhi female-oriented traditions, such as the wearing of their traditional Nakhi 
yangpis,
47
 this power did not elevate them to the same point of respect and 
civilization as their husbands and sons within Confucian discourses of hierarchy, both 
the Han Chinese version and the tweaked Nakhi versions that arose as a result of 
assimilation, e.g. the Nakhi male obsession with education and fame.  
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Instead, Nakhi women were seen as a more sheng manifestation of Nakhi 
culture, and, thus, were seen as more authentically Nakhi than their male counterparts. 
Within both Han and “popular local representations of Nakhi women,” due to the 
history of male education and sinicization, Nakhi women were seen as “traditional, 
illiterate, and backward in contrast to Naxi men, who [were] associated with Chinese 
practices, literacy, and civilization.” 
48
 Nakhi women began, more and more, to be 
associated with a discourse related to their lot as laborers and the bearers of the brunt 
of most burdens in Nakhi society. White refers to this indigenous Nakhi construction 
of female identity as a discourse of “[s]uffering, [s]acrifice, and [a]uthenticity.”
49
 The 
wearing of the seven-star sheepskin cape (qixin yangpi) by a Nakhi woman is a 
physical representation of the Nakhi women’s bitter lot of endless work for her family 
at her own expense.  The cape, as White aptly describes it, “serves a double 
metaphor: as padding for the literal and figurative burdens they bear and as a symbol 
of the stars that are still in the sky when they get up in the morning,” as well as the 
moon that has already risen when they return home from the fields or from her shop 
or trading post on Si Fang Jie in Dayanzhen.
50
  
This value of endless labor, physically represented in the qixing yangpi, has 
had a twofold implication for Nakhi female identity: Nakhi women have become 
enmeshed in a discourse of self-sacrifice through labor and have been even further 
distanced from Han women. By engaging in the qixing ideal of labor, “Nakhi women 
are demonstrating the depth of commitment to their families through literally giving 
their bodies to them,” which has consequently led many Nakhi women to live lives 
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plagued by diseases of labor, e.g. arthritis, chronic headaches, and other chronic pain 
conditions, while their house-bound husbands stereotypically die of strokes, heart 
conditions, and liver failure, all diseases of leisure, a phenomenon that I myself 
witnessed still occurring today, as will be discussed later on. 
51
 As well, this 
emphasis on Nakhi women’s physical sturdiness caused even further bifurcation 
between the gender constructions of Han Chinese women and Nakhi women under 
Confucian discourses. Confucian “normative constructions of deficient female 
bodies” have permeated Han gender construction for thousands of years, but this 
discourse has made no inroads into Nakhi constructions of gender due to Nakhi 
women’s traditional observance of their qixing inspired value of manual labor.
52
Thus, 
Nakhi women, unlike Nakhi men, cannot be seen as equivalent or nearly so to their 
Han counterparts.  
These Nakhi discourses, both the internalized Confucian discourses and the 
indigenous Nakhi discourses, survived Liberation and the Mao era despite the 
discourses’ Confucian roots. The Chinese Communist Party wanted to bring China’s 
ethnic minorities under the wing socialist state, instead of feudal, Confucian 
civilization, and, therefore, vehemently denied that their policies with regards to 
minority nationalities bore any connection to feudal, Confucian discourses of 
civilization. Stone-Banks, however, elucidates the continuity between the discourses 
of Maoist socialism and Confucianism stating,“ Similarly, the CCP’s justification for 
rescinding the promises of self-determination for minorities and for placing Han and 
Han-trained leaders in minority areas was largely based upon the premise that the 
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Han would enculture the minority nationalities…Similar to Confucian civilizing 
projects, the CCP’s aim was to help bring the minority nationalities up to the Han 
level of development.”
53
 Essentially, the modernizing force of Socialism supplanted 
the civilizing force of Confucianism, but the ethnic hierarchies of the Confucian 
discourse persisted nonetheless under Mao. This allowed for internal Nakhi 
discourses of the advanced sinicized Nakhi man and the hard-working, authentic, yet 
backward Nakhi woman to persist as well, meaning that the gendered nature of Nakhi 
identity would survive well into the era of Chinese Contemporary History; it survives, 
in some respects, even today. 
The final discourse that warrants mention before we progress to understanding 
the development of Lijiang is the spatialization of Nakhi authenticity. Due to the 
relative sinicization of Nakhi people living in Dayanzhen and the most central areas 
of the Lijiang basin, Nakhi people residing, even in villages in areas as nearby as Bai 
Sha and Lashi Hai, both located less than an hour from Lijiang Old Town by public 
bus or by baoche, started to be seen as more authentically Nakhi, as better upholding 
core Nakhi traditions. White speaks to this spatialization in nearly the same 
dichotomizing terms that he applied to Nakhi discursive gender, stating,“ If a ‘basin 
Naxi-centric’ geographical/spatial model…is conjured up…Dayanzhen, located at the 
center of the basin, is associated with progress, cleanliness, and a high degree of 
(equivalent to ideal Han) ‘cultural’ influence. Naxi villages of the basin, extending 
out from Dayanzhen…are associated with relative backwardness, relative 
uncleanliness, and relative lack of culture,” as well as relative Nakhi-ness, illustrating 
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The presence of Han culture, however, is not the only cultural factor that has 
led to the creation of this spatialization discourse. The presence of Dongba ritual 
practitioners and Dongba ritual practice in outlying regions of the Nakhi domain is 
equally as important. I will address Chao’s assertions about the uses of Dongba 
culture, a phrase to which she liberally applies quotation marks, for the development 
Lijiang in the next section, but it will be important to first understand this idea of 
spatialized authenticity and its link with the Dongbas. Chao claims that “[i]dentifying 
‘dongba culture’ as the core of Naxi heritage has significant implications for the 
representation of the Naxi people. According to Naxi scholars [located in the Lijiang 
basin], the ‘living representatives’ of Naxi culture-the ‘real Naxi’-can be found only 
in the mountain districts (shan qu) far from the influence of the Chinese.”
55
 This 
discursive separation of shan qu Nakhi and Nakhi living within the bound of Lijiang 
city (Lijiang chengshi,) whom I will refer to henceforth as chengshi Nakhi, radiating 
outward from Dayanzhen out into the mountainous regions surrounding the Lijiang 
basin, created a deep rift in how both chengshi and shanqu Nakhi saw themselves 
within the States discourses of hierarchical civilization. In the Nakhi mind, those 
shanqu Nakhi living further from the cultural and economic center of Lijiang were 
less modernized and less civilized due to their deeper understanding of Dongba 
traditions, which the state viewed as feudal and superstitious, as well as their 
relatively low level of han hua. On the other hand, chengshi Nakhi were viewed by 
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the state as relatively advanced due to their disconnection from Nakhi tradition and 
their relatively high level of han hua. The Nakhi subsequently internalized this view 
of themselves as reified, thus creating a spectrum of advancement with male chengshi 
Nakhi as the ideal and shanqu Nakhi women as a form of Nakhi-ness to be at once 
avoided for their lack of Han culture and revered for their authentic Nakhi 
traditionalism. This spectrum of Nakhi identity would be further reified and its rifts 
deepened with the explosive development of Lijiang beginning in the Contemporary 
Era. 
Contemporary History of the Lijiang Nakhi and Lijiang’s 
Development (1978-Present) 
 
 After the turbulent end to the Mao Era following the Chairman’s death in 
1976, China, and, as a result, the Nakhi, began to embark on a wholly different path, 
the path of Deng Xiao Ping’s 1978 Reform and Opening policies (gaige kaifang.) 
And the Nakhi people were very well positioned to capitalize on this new foray into 
the new world of market economics with Lijiang Old Town being their key resource.  
Charles F. McKhann, although writing his article in 2001, late in Lijiang Old 
Town’s journey to its current state of development, describes the appeal of Lijiang 
Old Town well, lying in the town’s “maze of picturesque cobblestone lanes, lined 
with century-old wooden houses and storefronts [being] dissected by small, tree-lined 
canals, all flowing from a single spring.”
56
 Lijiang Old Town was a Nakhi town 
frozen in time, a well-maintained slice of Ming and Qing dynasty China, unique in 
the care that had been taken to preserve its essence, even in throughout the 
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destruction of tradition that typified the Cultural Revolution. This protection of 
Lijiang’s physical past stemmed from the decision of the majority Nakhi government 
of Lijiang city in the 1950s,“ to preserve it’s Old Town, and to establish a separate 
‘New Town’ section for modern buildings” while most cities at the time had 
bulldozed such old neighborhoods in exchange for the concrete skyscrapers and 
apartment blocks of Socialist modernity.
57
 McKhann goes on to say that “[t]his 
decision has paid off in recent years, as mainly urban Han (‘Chinese’) tourists flock 
there to re-imagine the place of [their own] small town past,” which, while being 
somewhat ironic, further demonstrates Nakhi people’s closeness to the Han.
58
 In 
1986, the Chinese State Council declared Lijiang Old Town a national treasure,
59
 and, 
in 1994,“ at the suggestion of China’s Prime Minister and with the support of the 
former Naxi governor of Yunnan, Lijiang began to develop its potential within the 
tourism industry by enhancing and promoting its many scenic areas,” further boosting 
Old Town’s prospects as a future tourist destination.
60
  
However, the biggest strides the Nakhi made towards making Old Town into 
the attraction that it has become came after February 1996 from an unexpected source: 
a massive earthquake. Much of Lijiang was destroyed by a quake registering at 7.0 on 
the Richter scale, which killed 322 people, injured 14,000 people, destroyed 186,000 
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homes, and displaced an additional 300,000 people from their homes.
61
 Under the 
leadership of the aforementioned former Nakhi governor, his name is He Zhiqiang, 
Lijiang began to rebuild, concentrating a large amount of resources on improving the 
devastated Old Town. According to McKhann,“ [m]uch of the ‘rebuilding’ process 
actually involved a great deal of expansion (especially in tourism infrastructure.)”
62
 
This rapid and aggressive expansion in the wake of the earthquake put Lijiang on an 
absolutely explosive trajectory. In 1997, UNESCO’s
63
 World Heritage Committee 
pronounced Lijiang’s Old Town “an exceptional ancient town set in a dramatic 
landscape which represents the harmonious fusion of different cultural traditions to 
produce an urban landscape of outstanding quality,” and, thus, declared Lijiang as a 
UNESCO World Heritage site, which garnered additional funding and investment for 
the maintenance (read as “expansion and modernization”) of Old Town.
64
 By the 
next year “a total of 2,010,000 tourists visited the area, 56,000 (5%) of whom were 
foreigners” generating an impressive “1.04 billion RMB” in that year alone. 
65
 Hotels, 
guesthouses, and other tourist accommodations spread like wildfire in and around the 
Old Town “[f]rom two in the late 1980s, the number of hotels…increased to nearly 
two dozen large hotels and several dozen small ones by the end of 1998” representing 
a large portion of tourism investment and revenue.
66
 This expansion was 
accompanied by an increase in “numbers of restaurants, taxis and tour buses, tourism 
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offices, new and improved roads, shops, banks, and nightclubs,” all markers of 
infrastructure, especially tourism infrastructure, development.
67
 All of this rapid 
development of Lijiang brought massive benefits to the Nakhi people of Lijiang and 
the Lijiang basin, who generally approved of the move to develop the Old Town and 
supported the efforts with great pride at the national and international recognition 
their Old Town had garnered.  
 Although broad approval did exist within the Nakhi people involved, there 
were unforeseen consequences of the development that led some to question the 
trajectory that had been chosen for Old Town. The first problem that arose was one of 
Capitalism applied too passionately. As early as 1999, just two years after Old Town 
received the much coveted designation as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, 
“UNESCO’s own regional and cultural advisor for Asia and the Pacific was moved to 
admit that ‘Lijiang’s tourism growth is totally out of control,” a slight at the backers 
of Old Town’s rapid growth, to say the very least.
68
 Many projects like Lijiang’s Old 
Town that began to take off within the decade following Deng’s Gaige Kaifang 
policies were known for a certain degree of overzealousness, e.g. the sudden 
development of Deng’s famed SEZ’s was marred with many problems, regulatory 
and social in nature, and I believe this is what happened in Old Town. The zeal with 
which the Nakhi had approached the Republican Revolution, Communist Liberation, 
and the Cultural Revolution make the author suspicious that the “out of control” 
nature of Old Town’s expansion likely stemmed from an enthusiastic, perhaps overly 
so, application of free market approaches to modernization by the Nakhi.  
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 The second major problem was the discourse that Lijiang was developed 
around and its tourism economy built upon. That discourse being, which Emily Chao 
loves to deride with quotes, the discourse of “Dongba culture.” The system of belief 
administered by Dongba ritual practitioners
69
 within the culture of the Nakhi, along 
with the pictographic script employed by these practitioners for ritual incantations 
quickly became universalized symbols representing the whole of Nakhi culture to the 
Chinese populous and to the international community as a whole. How did this small 
aspect of Nakhi culture become an all-encompassing symbol for Nakhi-ness? This 
misrepresentation of the Nakhi that can be seen on every street, nay in every solitary 
shop, in Lijiang’s Old Town can be explained by the discourses of Nakhi identity 
discussed above; “Dongba culture” was an invention, a consequence of gendered and 
spatialized Nakhi authenticity.  
Dongba pictographic script, the only surviving hieroglyphic language in the 
world according the Nakhi and Chinese scholars, was seen by many Nakhi 
government officials as an easily marketable and easily promoted aspect of Nakhi 
culture. A man who Chao refers to by the pseudonym Ma Borou, the first Party 
secretary of Lijiang, is the person most often credited with the “rise of Dongba 
culture” in the forms that it is observed and consumed in modern day Lijiang.
70
 
Under the direction of Ma Borou and others, despite the disappearance of Dongba in 
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the Lijiang basin during the Cultural Revolution, Dongba religion and its traditional 
script were “sanitized and secularized”
71
into a form “that could be accepted by the 
Chinese state” and by the forces of the tourism industry under the socialist state.
72
 
This sanitization and secularization was accomplished by removing the superstitious 
and backwards elements of Dongba, namely the removal of the chaotic, superstitious, 
and female figures of the Sanba, or the Lubu (shamanistic practitioners,) from the 
cannon of Dongba, and transforming Dongba into an academic pursuit reserved for 
highly educated Nakhi men at the Dongba Research Institute in Lijiang.
73
 This 
sanitization also recreated the spatialization of Nakhi authenticity in that the academic 
pursuit of Dongba was isolated to the Dongba Research Institute, while the surviving 
practice of Dongba was relegated to the far reaches of the rural shangqu Nakhi. 
 Chao states that “Ma Borou was well aware of the prestige accorded written 
language in Chinese culture and its strong association with the Chinese concept 
of…civilization,” however,“ [t]hese forms of writing…had been used exclusively by 
dongbas for ritual purposes and were generally unintelligible to the broader Naxi 
population” meaning that a form of writing that was only read by male Dongbas in 
the post-Mao Era (Nakhi language has no other traditional written form) was 
promoted as the core point of value in Nakhi culture, further excluding women from 
endeavors of high culture within Nakhi society.
74
 This gendered distinction 
represents a continuation of the imperial discursive threads that marginalized Nakhi 
women into the realms of labor and economic in the past, and also represents a 
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wholly new fabrication of Nakhi culture for the sake of making Old Town more 
attractive to the state and to tourists. Evidence of this fabrication can be seen in the 
use of Dongba pictographs on any number of “shop signboards, letterhead, [and] tour 
company logos,”
75
 as well as fast food restaurant and hotel signs, a high percentage 
of the pictographs being meaningless, even nonsensical, according to one scholar at 
the Dongba Research Institute.
76
 
As Chao aptly describes the state of “Dongba Culture” at the outset of Old 
Town’s development, “Thus, the promotion of dongba culture is not a grassroots 
phenomenon; it is not something that articulates a primordial sense of identity or way 
of life that has tenaciously survive the historical transformations since 1949 to 
suddenly percolate upward and manifest itself in the post-Mao era,”
77
 only 
confirming McKhann’s assertion that, in modern China, tourism is a “top-down” 
endeavor.
78
 Chao is correct that Nakhi Dongba is not linked to a “primordial sense of 
identity or way of life” for most Nakhi people, but this does not mean that it does not 
hold meaning in any way for the Nakhi, as I will discuss later in regards to my own 
observations. 
The final drawback for the Nakhi of Lijiang that has arisen as a result of the 
Old Town’s development is a set of social ramifications for the local Nakhi people 
that lie outside of these imperial and modern discourses. With the expansion of 
tourism infrastructure and the exponential rise in tourist numbers, many Nakhi have 
left Lijiang’s Old Town in favor of the New Town. McKhann claims that this is 
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simply due to the Nakhi of Old Town being “[f]ed up with the intrusive touristic 
gaze” that permeates Old Town, but the real reasons are far more complex.
79
 In my 
own discussions with locals, I discovered that most buildings in Old Town are still 
owned by Nakhi locals, but these owners have chosen to play the role of landlord, 
allowing mostly Han Chinese, Tibetan, and Bai shop owners to rent space from which 
to sell faux Dongba paraphernalia and other souvenirs, as opposed to maintaining the 
Nakhi owned and operated “local tofu, noodle, leather goods, oil, and rice shops” that 
used to line the streets of Lijiang.
80
 Li Guo Wu, a local Nakhi government minister 
who works for the Tourism Bureau, estimated to me that perhaps “as low as 20 or 
30% of the shops in Old Town” are still owned and run by Nakhi women, although 
that statistic is probably somewhat high in reality (interestingly, neither the Tourism 
Bureau nor the Yu Long County Women’s Federation keep statistics on this matter.)
81
 
Instead, most non-Nakhi owners are Han Chinese migrants to Lijiang from places like 
Zhejiang Province and China’s northeastern provinces.
82
 Aside from the Nakhi who 
were lucky enough to be able to rent their homes and shops, many Nakhi people have 
been priced out of the Old Town where real estate prices have absolutely sky-
rocketed.  
Another social issue, faced exclusively by Nakhi women in Lijiang’s Old 
Town is rampant sexualization that did not exist to the same extent in Nakhi society 
prior to the development of Lijiang. MchKhann notes this sexualization in many 
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Nakhi stage shows that take place in and around the Old Town in his account of a 
performance that takes place at the Dongba Palace: 
In the performance, the dongba’s trumpets are ceremoniously proffered to him 
by two ‘traditionally’ dressed Naxi ‘maidens’-a highly unlikely event in terms 
of historical dongba practice-which injects the scene with an aura of latent 
(patriarchal) sexuality. The feminization and eroticization of (especially 
southwestern) minorities in Han popular imagination has a long and well-
documented history…In common with Moso cultural performances at Lugu 





This kind of sexual imagery, depicting Nakhi women as scantly clad sexual objects, 
can be seen throughout Lijiang in everything from “traditional” wood carvings to 
paintings, from advertisements to Dongba wind chimes. This sexualization has even 
become enshrined in Lijiang’s protection policies. In its efforts to encourage Nakhi 
women to wear their traditional garb, the Lijiang government has made slight changes 
to the original design. Bonner notes these changes saying,“ For example, the brightly 
colored belt that younger Naxi girls wear originates from Tibetan dress. Local 
officials added this to the dress to enhance its appearance as well as to give younger 
women a waistline, considering it more flattering than the original,” a change that 
constitutes a concerted effort to sex up Nakhi girls for the sake of drawing the Han 
tourists’ gaze.
84
 This kind of sexual augmentation of Nakhi female dress can also be 
seen in the modern, gaudy, and form-revealing costumes worn by Nakhi women who 
will smilingly pose with tourists in front of Lijiang Old Town’s northern gate and the 
adjacent water wheels. The sexual has atmosphere in Lijiang is thick like Beijing’s 
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smog, earning the Old Town yet another moniker in the minds of many tourists aside 
from the Disney Land reference: “the one night stand capital of China.”
85
 
The Lijiang Nakhi Today (Field Assessment of Nakhi Discourses Lijiang’s 
Development and Nakhi Cultural Change)  
Lijiang has changed drastically since its days as the Nakhi Kingdom’s seat of 
power, culture, and economics. The explosive growth of the Contemporary Era has 
caused Lijiang to become an international tourist destination that attracts millions, but 
has also maintained age old imperial and early modern discourses of Nakhi identity 
and authenticity, no small feat to say the least. This has occurred as a result of the 
Nakhi people’s ability to culturally adjust, adapting advantageous changes to ensure 
their own survival. This long history of adjustment has led to the Lijiang that we see 
today and to the maintenance of the discourses that have been discussed and analyzed 
above.  
But where do the Nakhi of Lijiang stand today? What is the state of Nakhi 
culture and its, supposedly, most authentic representatives, Nakhi women, now that 
the year is 2013? What has changed? What remains the same? Are Nakhi women’s 
lives informed by the same discourses from the past? Assessing and attempting to 
answer these questions was the mission of my field research in Lijiang and its 
surrounding areas, both chengshi and shanqu. The two main disourses that I wanted 
to assess were the gendering and spatialization of Nakhi identity and authenticity, 
which I found easy to assess through interviews with women beginning in Lijiang and 
expanding out in a rippling formation into the Lijiang basin area, until I had reached 
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the furthest possible distance on which the development of Lijiang might still have an 
effect. I treated Old Town as my epicenter, Bai Sha as the first ripple, a village 
adjacent to Lashi Hai called Nanyao as the second ripple, a somewhat remote village 
called Da Ju on a plateau facing Tiger Leaping Gorge served as the third, and a small 
village on the Haba Snow Mountain side of Tiger Leaping Gorge simply called Haba 
village as the outer boundary of Lijiang Nakhi-ness. In each of these locales, I spoke 
to Nakhi men and women, as well as residents of other nationalities, e.g. Yi people 
and Han people, but the focus of my conversations was administering a standard 
interview to as many Nakhi women as possible, across these different spaces, but also 
across different age groups, which would help me get a baseline from which to gauge 
the effects of development over space and over time.
86
 However, personal 
observations also played an important role in my understanding of this situation. I 
conceptualized attitudes towards development and physical manifestations of that 
development as indicating the positive and negative cultural effects of development, 
thus deciding to take the word of the people who know best and represent most 
clearly what it means to be Nakhi. 
 
The Nakhi Women of Lijiang Old Town 
 As mentioned above, Nakhi women are actually somewhat hard to find within 
the confines of the originally Nakhi Old Town nowadays. Older Nakhi women are 
easily spotted, as many women over the ages forty or fifty years of age continue to 
wear more traditional qi xing yang pi’s, blue headdresses or, more commonly, blue 
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Liberation hats (jie fang mao zi,)
87
 maroon sweater vests, long grey or black slacks, 
simple black shoes, and, sometimes, a blue apron tied around their waist. Many of 
these women ran small vegetable stands or sold maps inside Old Town, having been 
exiled from their Old Town homes for one reason or another.  
Younger Nakhi women, on the other hand, might as well be Han Chinese 
when it comes to clothing. Walking through Zhong Yi Market, the place to where the 
Sifang Jie market of Tea Horse Caravan Road fame was relocated, Nakhi women 
under the age of forty are indistinguishable from their Han, Bai, Tibetan and even 
some of their Yi counterparts because Nakhi women have adopted Han styles, which 
are, in turn, mostly Western styles. Not one solitary soul under the age of forty could 
be seen wearing a yang pi, except for the rare four or five year old playing dress up 
and women wearing the yang pi emblazoned with the UNESCO World Heritage Site 
emblem. These women are paid by the Old Town protection government to wear this 
flashy, sexed up version of Nakhi garb. I probably saw one Nakhi man, who wasn’t 
working in a shop or tourist attraction, wearing traditional garb in my entire time in 
Lijiang. 
In an interview I had with the head of the Cultural Preservation and 
Management office of Old Town, I began to get a sense of which discourses still 
existed in Nakhi life, at least in the eyes of the state. A Han female government 
official, married to a Bai man, shared many enlightening opinions with regards to 
Nakhi women with me, saying,“ Nakhi men just like culture. Nakhi women work in 
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the fields and sell products while their men are at home. Here, Nakhi women rent 
their houses. They are really very clever. The development of Lijiang has opened up a 
lot more opportunities for them,” which is true. Nakhi women in Lijiang have higher 




Her tone with regards to Nakhi women held certain sexual undertones. She 
referred to a Peter Goullart story, a story that I have not been able to find in The 
Forgotten Kingdom, saying,“ There is a story of a Goullart seeing a Nakhi man 
relaxing on his horse while his wife works very hard in the fields. When Goullart 
asked the woman why she works so hard while her husband relaxes, she said,‘ No 
woman wants to stay with an exhausted husband at night. It’s better that I do this 
work.’” She also alluded to Nakhi women being better off wearing modern clothes or 
at least different versions of Nakhi clothing, saying,“ Those clothes are not 
convenient. They get very hot. Wool clothing cannot show a girl’s beautiful body,” 
and, with reference to such cultural changes in Lijiang, she asserted,“ Customs are 
very important. Ideas, hairstyles, and clothes can change, but maintaining customs is 
important. They would be stupid not to change. They would not be human,” adding a 
Marxist-Morganian social evolutionist tinge to the conversation; certain older, state 
discourses about minority nationalities are certainly alive and well.
89
 
In conversations I had with Nakhi women in Old Town, attitudes towards 
development were generally positive. One young woman that I met, aged into her 
mid-twenties, said,“ Lijiang developed very quickly from 1996. It was a small town, 
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and, now, it is a world-class city.”
90
 Although, according to a Han journalist friend of 
mine, this world-class status has come at a price. She said she had interviewed many 
people in Lijiang and she had discovered that “Lijiang’s development is unsustainable. 
Food and housing are very expensive, and prices are increasing. It is a tourist city. It 
is very difficult to live here. It’s almost impossible to live here without a lot of 
money.”
91
 A female shop owner, in about her eighties, running a stationary store near 
Sifang Jie told me that Lijiang was very poor before Gaige Kaifang, having lived in 
Old Town her whole life. While she seemed pleased with the improvements, she also 
lamented the Nakhi flight from Old Town. “I remember when everyone here spoke 
Nakhi, now we speak Chinese for the tourists.”
92
  
The themes of cultural preservation that arose in my conversations were very 
interesting. Nakhi language and the qi xing ideal of labor arose as the most important 
aspects of Nakhi culture for most women that I spoke to in Old Town. The same 
young woman from above told me,“ We must preserve the Dongba pictographic 
script,” despite the fact that she could only read a few words and said she could not 
understand much if any more complex writing.
93
 She and her friends do, however, 
speak Nakhi in their everyday life, only using Chinese with tourists. They said that 
the hard work of their ancestors was also something that they hoped to preserve in 
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 She went on to say that there has been a great deal of cultural 
change in Lijiang and that many Nakhi have a high degree of sinicized (han hua) 
tendencies. However, about these changes, she said,“ I think the changes to Nakhi 
culture have been good. It’s not so traditional anymore. Nakhi people are more 
modern and open,” a wholly positive sentiment in her mind.
95
 
This positive attitude towards modernization and openness pervaded my 
conversations with Nakhi women in Lijiang. However, sometimes actions spoke 
louder than words. I encountered two stories of Nakhi women having difficulties 
adjusting to the openness of Old Town, specifically with regards to the openness of 
modern dating. Two expatriate friends of mine recounted stories of relationships with 
Nakhi women gone awry. The first was almost stabbed by his girlfriend when he 
attempted to break things off with her.
96
 The second, a Nakhi woman in her thirties 
named Lily, who I once heard recount the following story at a bar with a surprising 
amount of nonchalance, openly admitted to having smashed bottles on the face of a 
Han woman who had rubbed her the wrong way by flirting with her Mexican 
bartender boyfriend.
97
 I do not wish to generalize to hastily from these two stories, 
but I think it is safe to at least postulate that Nakhi women may be prone to problems 
of adjustment, especially to patriarchal systems of economic power in which they are 
no longer the dominant force. It is, however, to early to cast judgment on this issue. 
Nakhi women have just begun to accept modernity more openly, having just begun to 
adopt habits such as drinking alcohol and smoking cigarettes, activities that are 
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traditionally reserved for Nakhi men. This was a transition that Han women went 
through as well in the early twentieth century, and many Han women also had a great 
deal of trouble adjusting to modern power dynamics and behavioral expectations (see 
any Chinese soap opera about Shanghai’s Golden Age for evidence of this 
phenomenon.)  
I found some limited evidence of the spatialization discourse in Lijiang, which 
was generally closely tied to ideas regarding modernization, opening up, and han hua. 
The Bai minority Chairwoman of the Women’s Federation of Yu Long County 
recounted to me how the rural Nakhi women whom she works with to improve 
village hygiene, female education, and childcare,“ are more traditional and place a lot 
of importance on culture,” as opposed to Lijiang residents.
98
 I also heard this from Li 
Guo Wu’s Nakhi female assistant who informed me that I would find “real Nakhi 
culture” in smaller villages outside of the influence of Lijiang.
99
 It was interesting to 
me that these women, both in close and regular contact with rural Nakhi women, 
engaged in this somewhat stereotypical discourse. Li Go Wu’s assistant, for example, 
had accompanied me to talk with the Cultural Preservation and Management official, 
and she had pushed back on the idea that Nakhi women still do all the work. “That’s 
not really the case anymore. Because of the One-Child Policy, families are much 
smaller, and it doesn’t make sense for women to do all the work when there is so 
much to be done.”
100
 The Chairwoman of the Women’s Federation also chalked ideas 
like women doing all the work up to a old Nakhi legends, so I also assumed she 
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would not make such a sweeping generalization of rural women. This illustrates the 
ever-present nature of these discourses of gender and spatialization in every day 
Nakhi life, at least in Lijiang. 
Baisha Wan Xiao (Baisha Primary School) 
 Just outside of Lijiang, about half an hour by public bus, lays the village of 
Baisha. When I first arrived there, I felt like I was in another, newer, and less 
developed version of Lijiang’s Old Town. The central part of the town was filled with 
Han Chinese and European tourists, perusing the offerings of an uncountable number 
of trinket shops selling Little Red Books, prayer beads, and, curiously, Egyptian and 
Native American statuettes. There were also a handful of high end cafes, halal 
restaurants for Hui minority visitors, and hostels, as well as traditional Nakhi homes 
advertised for rent, sometimes both in English and Chinese. Honestly, Baisha 
discouraged me because a functional farming village had been transformed into a 
marketable tourist destination that bore no feasible function for the actual residents of 
Baisha, all of whom seemed relatively poor and lived outside the town on the farms.  
 However, Baisha was home to one beacon of hope for Nakhi cultural survival, 
and that beacon shone brightly, just at the base of the Jade Dragon Snow Mountain: 
the All-Baisha Primary School (baisha wanxiao.) I walked into the school around 
3:00pm, not knowing what to expect to find there as I was acting on a tip from a 
Nakhi language teacher from the village of Nanyao. I was told that there was a 
compulsory Nakhi language class at All-Baisha Primary School, but that was the 
extent of what I had heard. As I passed the gate and wandered into the main 
quadrangle of the school, I saw a group of young boys dressed in the garb of a 
44 
Dongba, all milling around in the shade of some trees, waiting for direction from their 
teachers. These boys commenced their Dongba ritual dance class, and I got a first 
hand glimpse into the cutting-edge of Nakhi cultural preservation efforts. 
 One teacher founded this Nakhi culture curriculum at All-Baisha Primary 
School, a school that has a student body that is ninety-nine or ninety-eight percent 
Nakhi ten years ago, during the golden age of Lijiang’s development. “We want to 
make sure these children can speak their mother tongue and their own culture because 
things are changing so quickly in this area.”
101
 Their Nakhi language program is 
taught to children in grades three through six. These children are issued textbooks that 
teach Nakhi language using the Nakhi version of the pin yin system of Romanization, 
Dongba pictographic script that is representational, Dongba pictographic script that is 
more similar to Chinese characters in use, the international pronunciation system, as 
well as alongside Chinese characters. Children at all levels learn the language using 
all five of these systems. But, this curriculum is not just focused on teaching Nakhi 
language; it is about teaching Nakhi children about the depth of their own culture. 
The curriculum also includes Nakhi traditional music (mainly Baisha’s own ancient 
style,) Dongba ritual dance as I saw being practiced on the playground, as well other 
forms of traditional Nakhi dance, and Dongba painting. The teacher spoke to the 
efficacy and purposes of classes like this: 
Schools with these kinds of classes are very few. Our purpose is to preserve 
Nakhi culture and language for the future. Our method is not the best, but it 
works. Some students will become specialists if they find it interesting, but 
most will go on to do other things. At least they will all know their own 
language and understand their own culture. During the Mao Era, there was a 
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policy against the study of Dongba culture, and much was lost during that 




This program has a good amount of support from the Chinese state, in the form of 
approval from local Nakhi autonomous region’s government. They make inspections 
to check on progress and, presumably, practice, but the teachers I talked to said that 
the government sees this program as a model for minority education. In relation to 
women, this kind of education is particularly advantageous. “Girls are learning 
Dongba rituals and Dongba script here as well, but its mostly boys, which is 
tradition,” said the Nakhi language teacher. Allowing women to study Nakhi 
language and other aspects of Nakhi culture could aid Nakhi women in becoming 
more empowered within their communities by allowing them access a higher degree 
of education from an earlier age. And, democratizing Nakhi language in this way 
could also ensure the language’s survival, especially considering that Nakhi traditions 
become more and more relevant and important to Nakhi women with every passing 
day and less and less important to the han hua Nakhi men of Lijiang. I decided that I 
needed to further investigate Nakhi education in shanqu areas, farther from Lijiang in 
order to better understand the preservation efforts with regards to language and the 
inclusion of Nakhi women in those efforts. 
The Nakhi Women of Nanyao 
Nanyao is a small village of about 1,800 residents, about an hour outside of 
Lijiang in the area surrounding Lashi Hai. The town is about 68% Nakhi, while the 
remaining 32% is entirely Yi minority people. The average annual income is just 
around 2,500 RMB, which is fairly high by rural China standards. When I first went 




to Nanyao in 2008, the village was virtually untouched by tourism or any kind of 
development for that matter. Aside from a kindergarten, a primary school, and a 
handful of shops, the town was entirely made up of farming family houses and little 
else just five years ago.
103
  
Now, things have changed. There are solar-powered street lamps, added two 
years ago by a public works project, that light once dark roads. There are wide-landed 
highways leading to Nanyao, which more closely resembled dirt paths not so long ago. 
There are about double the number of convenience stores, a few tiny noodle and liang 
fen
104
 shops, and even a mahjong parlor fitted with automatic shuffling tables. Still, 
one man I interviewed said to me,“ We [Nakhi] are a very backwards people. We’re 
at the level of development Americans experienced during 1800s,” a doubtful 
statement at best, but a sign of where some shanqu Nakhi see themselves on the 
ladder of Chinese society.
105
  
Since 2009, about 15,000 tourists per year pass through Nanyao, in the wake 
of the development of the road system, according to a local Yi minority official.
106
 
Many young people, about ten every year, go off to college from Nanyao, and then 
return to the area to find work in Lijiang or in other cities. However, they generally 
avoid work in the tourism industry due to their degree, but some do return to work the 
fields in Nanyao. There is a massive new Buddhist temple being built square in the 
middle of Nanyao by a private business owner, clearly a very rich man. He has 
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erected the temple as a beacon to the Lashi Hai valley, encouraging tourists from far 
and wide to make the drive to Nanyao. Perhaps those college graduates will have a 
job in the temple’s massive complex one day, and won’t have to leave home for 
Lijiang.  
The women of Nanyao are as hardworking as Nakhi women. The woman who 
I stayed with, the ever hospitable and welcoming Li Ayi,
107
 Living with here and her 
family introduced me to Nanyao back in 2008, and she was happy to have me back 
again, and equally happy to introduce me to her cohort of women friends. She lives 
alone with her mother in-law now because both of her children attend college 
elsewhere, her son for automotive engineering and her daughter for medicine. Her 
husband died just four months ago of a heart condition, as did her father in-law some 
years before. She does not worry or grieve though, like a true Nakhi woman, she goes 
out into the fields every day to sacrifice herself through labor for her family, her yang 
pi shielding her from the bitterness and burdensomeness of life. Contrary to what 
people in Lijiang asserted, culture is of little concern to women like Li Ayi. In reality, 
she knows very little of her own culture. Like the residents of Lijiang whom I spoke 
to, she knows no Nakhi legends, knows no Nakhi history, does not have a Dongba in 
her area to administer ceremonies, and she only wears her fanciest Nakhi costume for 
holidays like the Lunar New Year and any time there is a dancing event in the village. 
As Li Ayi herself said,“ In this area, we are all Lijiang people.”
108
  
Despite this assertion that Lijiang and Nanyao are the same, Li Ayi also 
noted,“ Out lives have changed very slowly as a result of development, but it has 
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changed somewhat,” emphasizing the centralization of Lijiang’s wealth.
109
 Also, 
unlike anyone that I met in Lijiang, Li Ayi’s mother in-law openly tried to assert, 
“Han and Nakhi are all the same! What difference does it really make?”
110
 All Nakhi 
people that I met in Lijiang, despite the Nakhi penchant for assimilation, never 
equated the Nakhi and the Han in this way, erasing boundaries of ethnicity altogether. 
I think this attitude likely stems from an internalized nationalist discourse, likely a 
product of having lived through the fanatic nationalism of the Mao Era and the 
Cultural Revolution. For those women that I spoke to in Nanyao who did see a clear 
difference between Nakhi and Han, similarly to the Nakhi women of Lijiang, 
language and core values of labor and sacrifice were the linchpin to which this sense 
of independent identity was tethered. Physical culture like clothes, aside from the qi 
xing yang pi, were not seen as cultural differentiators, partially due to the fact that 
many Nakhi women only wear these flashier, traditional clothes to celebrate Nakhi 
holidays, which have blended with Han festivals a great deal, and for national 
holidays such as International Labor Day (May 1
st
) and International Women’s Day 
(March 8
th
.) Nakhi female-centric customs, aside from language and labor, have 
either been inexorably intertwined with overarching Chinese Confucian and national 
traditions or have faded away entirely in Nanyao.  
Another woman that I spoke to in Nanyao who helped elucidate the state of 
Nakhi culture and development in the village was the female owner of a liang fen and 
raw tofu stand in the center of town. The liang fen was only 3 RMB per bowl, so I 
spent a lot of time in her shop. She is aged into her sixties dawns, like most of her 




 Li Ayi’s mother in-law (farmer in Nanyao) in discussion with author. May 2013. 
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friends of her age, a qi xing yang pi, a blue Liberation hat, a blue vest (the same shade 
as her hat,) and an apron to match. She speaks Nakhi in her daily life, so her Yunnan 
dialect has taken on a thick Nakhi accent, unintelligible to my untrained ear at times. 
However, I did manage to glean a great deal of information about her life from our 
conversation. She has lived in Nanyao for twenty-two years, having moved from a 
nearby village in order to open up her liang fen shop, and make a better living. She 
has done very well for herself. Two years ago she was able to travel for two weeks to 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou on her well-maintained savings. However, with the 
development of the Lashi Hai area, prices for the peas and soybeans necessary for her 
business have begun to rise. Because of the expense, she had to raise her prices from 
2 RMB to 3 RMB per bowl of liang fen, a large increase in a village like Nanyao, and 
she allows her neighbors to barter equivalent weight of soybeans for tofu and 
equivalent weight in peas for liang fen. “It used to be just 2 RMB for a bowl of liang 
fen with all the spices and sauces, but now the peas are too expensive, deathly 
expensive,” she told with a shake of her head. With increased development have 
come increased difficulties in some respects, and this woman’s liang fen shop can 
attest to those difficulties.
111
 
 As well, this one woman’s use of barter represents Nakhi traditional systems 
of reciprocity, especially between women. White illustrates this internal discourse of 
Nakhi gender roles in the following passage: 
What is important to note about Naxi women’s “eating bitterness” role…is 
that it is an ethos of suffering and sacrifice that is not privatized and 
individualized but one that is acknowledged, valorized, and reified by family 
and other community members and also shared with other women 
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(extrafamilial friends of the same general age.) Indeed, a Naxi woman’s 
prestige is dependent on her ability to mobilize labor networks among other 
women. Naxi women gain fame from their “kindness” to the other women 
who are their…friends with whom they frequently exchange labor [and 
goods]…[H]uo cuo, or credit associations that operate primarily based on a 
metaphor of sisterhood, epitomize this emphasis on cooperation and shared 




Such reciprocal arrangements of labor exist in many areas of China, within many 
ethnic minority societies, if just purely out of necessity due to the One Child Policy. 
However, this pact of sisterhood and mutual struggle is unique to Nakhi women. I 
witnessed additional collaborative labor efforts of this sort alongside Li Ayi and her 
mother in-law. Despite or perhaps, in the Nakhi context of female self-sacrifice, as a 
result of their status as widows, Li Ayi and her mother in-law spent many of their 
days not only tending to their own house and field chores, but toiling in the fields of 
their friends and relatives for a nominal sum of money, seedlings, or other necessary 
farm products. 
 One day the three of us ventured to a lower village, to the home of one of Li 
Ayi’s close friends. While she and her mother in-law helped the women of the other 
family plant corn and ready other fields for planting, I was sent off to help the father 
and eldest son of the family with their jobs as tour guides on a horseback-riding trail 
for Han tourists. Upon our respective returns, a the family we were aiding cooked a 
meal for everyone, and then furnished Li Ayi and her mother in-law with gifts of chili 
pepper seedlings as well as a few 100 RMB; even I received 100 RMB, despite my 
vehement refusal, for spending the day on the horse trail, likely only because I was 
indirectly enmeshed in the women’s network for the day. This system of reciprocal 
                                                 
112
 White 1997: 319. 
51 
labor among women is an intriguing feature of Nakhi society, a cultural relic of the 
past that will no doubt survive into the future. 
 One of the other traditions that the Nakhi insist must be carried on into the 
future if they are to remain a people distinguishable from the Han Chinese majority is 
the continuation of Nakhi language. Nakhi language is alive and well in Nanyao and 
is spoken as the lingua franca among the Nakhi residents of the village as well as 
between the Nakhi and the Yi. Nakhi language has been well preserved through home 
teaching and everyday use, but Nanyao is somewhat special in that its primary school 
has a non-compulsory, bilingual program for Nakhi students, taught in grades one 
through six. The leader of the Nakhi language program told me the reasons behind 
not making the program compulsory, explaining,“ Because we have about fifty 
percent Nakhi students and fifty percent Yi students, it would be unfair for us to teach 
Nakhi language as a mandatory class to all of our students. Teaching Chinese is the 
fairest method. Therefore we only teach Nakhi language to talented students who 
want more advanced knowledge of their language. ”
113
  
First through fourth grade students use a government issued textbook, which 
covers stories of Chinese history in Nakhi language, using three systems of learning 
to help students understand the meaning, namely a Nakhi language equivalent of the 
pin yin system of Romanization, the international pronunciation guide as well as 
Chinese characters. Fifth and sixth graders can opt to take a class based on a textbook 
issued by the Dongba Research Institute, which teaches Dongba pictographic script 
by retelling Nakhi history and Nakhi legends of the Dongba system of belief. “Very 
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few students decide to study Nakhi language, but preserving Nakhi language is 
important for cultural preservation efforts,” especially because this class and the 
understanding of Dongba script is also offered to young girls, not just young boys, as 
tradition used to dictate with the father-son apprenticeships required of Dongba ritual 
practitioners.
114
 As stated before, imparting such knowledge to women may be the 
only way to ensure that certain aspects of Nakhi culture survive, due to the relative 
assimilation into Han culture of Nakhi men. Nakhi women could become vital vessels 
for Nakhi culture, instead of just its stereotypical representatives as can be seen in 
Lijiang.  
Perhaps one of the most interesting informants that I encountered in Nanyao, 
an informant who gave me both an insider’s and an outsider’s view of the Nakhi in 
Nanyao, was a female Han shop owner. She had married a Nakhi man, and she had 
since been fully absorbed into the Nakhi community of Nanyao; I actually mistook 
her for Nakhi and was only tipped off in retrospect by her very standard Mandarin. 
She met and married her husband in another area of Yunnan, but they had moved to 
Nanyao thirty or more years prior. She was kind enough to describe her life in Nakhi 
society to me in great detail: 
 I have gotten used to Nakhi life. I have a daughter with a grandson in second 
grade. We’re all used to this life. She also married a Nakhi man. The Nakhi 
here have a very hard life. The Nakhi in Lijiang are very lucky. Our land is 
not as good as the land in Lijiang, and the Nakhi there are wealthier. However, 
in terms of culture, we are all the same. The same is true of the Han and the 
Nakhi, the only difference is our language…I started learning Nakhi language 
in 1979, I used it through interaction with my husband’s community. I would 
listen to people, and if I didn’t understand what they were saying, then I 
would use Chinese to ask them the meaning. I still have some trouble after 
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thirty years. Nakhi is a very complicated language. I cannot read or write 




Her assertion that the Nakhi of Lijiang are the same as the shanqu Nakhi of Nanyao, 
and that the Nakhi and the Han are same aside from language, was consistent with Li 
Ayi and her mother in-law’s opinion, but in direct contradiction with the opinions of 
Nakhi living in Lijiang. As well, her comments about her knowledge of Nakhi 
language elucidate part of Emily Chao’s argument with regards to the invention of 
“Dongba culture.” While Dongba pictographs are connected to Nakhi language, there 
has never been a written form of Nakhi language used by the common people, until 
today with the use of Dongba script for everyday matters, as it is being taught in 
Nanyao’s private school. Not only democratizing the use of Dongba script to women, 
but also to the Nakhi common people as a whole by making Dongba pictographs the 
common written language of the Nakhi people could be another way to further 
preservation efforts. However, this must be done in a way that does not simply reduce 
Dongba script to nonsensical transliterations of Chinese names or strings of 
representative images that never existed before, as is seen in Lijiang’s Old Town.  
 When I asked the Nakhi-Han storeowner about her other experiences with 
Nakhi culture and the development of the area, she told me about Nakhi festivals that 
are still celebrated by Nanyao village. A handful of the festivals and holidays that she 
named were also Han Chinese festivals, such as the Mid-Autumn festival, the Spring 
festival, and Huo Ba festival, which was further indication of the absorption of Han 
traditions by the Nakhi. However, she also spoke to distinctly Nakhi traditions that 
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are still relevant to her life. “I have a qixing yangpi, but I only wear it during the 
winter because it’s too hot otherwise. The qixing ideal is still the most important ideal 
for Nakhi women, young and old. You’re not a real [Nakhi] woman unless you have 
this ideal,” indicating how much of a core ideal qixing truly continues to be.
116
 In 
regards to development, she said, simply,“ The changes have been too big. There are 
too many cars and too many big roads. We used to only eat corn before, but now we 
eat rice.”
117
 Despite these changes, however, she did not consider Nanyao to be a 
developed place, and insisted that Lijiang’s development has little to no effect on the 
development of Nanyao. “We’re too far from the city, we haven’t experienced much 
development. Our lives have changed, but there hasn’t been development, aside from 
more tourists, guesthouses, and increased incomes.” 
118
 This further illustrates the 
centralization of Lijiang’s resources around Old Town, quite vividly considering that 
Nanyao is located only an hour from Zhong Yi market by baoche. There were clear 
differences between the Nakhi of Nanyao and the Nakhi of Old Town, but the 
differences, more and more seemed to be differences of class and wealth, not a deep 




The Nakhi Women of Haba 








 My next destination on my journey away from Lijiang was a small village on 
the northern end of Tiger Leaping Gorge and at the foot of Haba Snow Mountain, 
simply called Haba Village. Haba is a town of 4,000 people, and it was originally an 
exclusively Nakhi village when it was founded hundreds of years ago. Now Haba’s 
population is seventy percent Nakhi, with the other thirty percent being constituted of 
Lisu, Yi, Han, Tibetan, and Hui people. The average annual income per household in 
Haba hovers around 10,000 RMB to 20,000 RMB, which breaks down to an annual 
income of about 3,000 RMB to 4,000 RMB per person, making Haba’s income 
slightly higher than that of Nanyao. A few thousand tourists a year, mostly higher 
income adventure tourists attempting to summit the more than 5,000 meter high Haba 
Snow Mountain, visit Haba per year, and there are four or five guesthouses for them 
all to stay in located in the central village. This tourism development has had 
educational benefits as I saw in Lijiang, Baisha, and Nanyao as well. Between forty 
and fifty students from Haba enroll in Chinese universities each year, most going to 
Zhongdian and Lijiang for their studies. However, most of those students do not go 
into the tourism industry after their graduation.
119
 
 Interestingly, Haba had begun its development a long time before Lijiang had 
even made its first major strides towards modernization. Haba was a commune during 
the Mao Era, and, thus, began Deng Xiao Ping’s Four Modernizations immediately 
after the process of decollectivization in the late 1970s. However, considering that 
Lijiang is a waypoint for most tourists trying to access Haba, if they are not coming 
from Zhongdian to the north, I assumed the people there would voice a strong 
connection between the two areas. To the contrary, the doctor and his wife claimed, 
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“Lijiang is very wealthy and developed very quickly. We developed more slowly. 
Lijiang is Lijiang. Haba is Haba. Zhongdian is Zhongdian. There’s not much 
connection.”
120
 Attitudes towards development in Haba were good across the board 
among both male and female Nakhi citizens. The doctor himself said,“ Development 
is surely good,” seeming to concentrate on the economic benefits and ignoring any 
cultural consequences, an attitude that I found to be common in shanqu areas that 
were once very poor.
121
 The doctor’s wife commented,“ I used to wear shoes made of 
corn husks, but things have been better since decollectivization and have improved 
very quickly in recent years.”
122
 The doctor, following this train of thought, said that 
Nakhi culture has not been changed by development, though he did readily admit that 
young people in Haba have experienced a large amount of han hua, but he did not 
seem to lament this change. 
 In Haba, unlike in Nanyao, Nakhi language is not the lingua franca. Nakhi 
people only speak Nakhi among themselves and with certain groups in the area that 
have a history of speaking the language. According to the male doctor that I spoke to 
about Haba’s demographic information,“ Lisu people can speak Nakhi, but the Yi 
people, the Tibetans, the Han, [and the Hui] cannot,” meaning that Chinese is the 
language most often spoken in the village.
123
 Much like the Nakhi of Nanyao, 
however, the doctor stated,“ We cannot read or write Dongba pictographic script. We 
can only speak the language,” further supporting Chao’s assertions with relation to 
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the invention of “Dongba culture” but poking holes in the idea that shanqu Nakhi are 
closer to the traditions of that culture.
124
 “There was a Dongba here before, but not 
any longer. Only the oldest people in our village remember him or know anything 
about Dongba. My wife and I know very little about it.”
125
 They had learned Nakhi 
language at home, and said that only Chinese is taught in the primary school in Haba. 
Despite this lack of knowledge of Dongba and it’s language, people in Haba still 
believe that preserving these aspects of Nakhi culture is an important endeavor and 
that the most important piece of this preservation should be preserving the Dongba’s 
pictographic language. 
 The elderly Nakhi woman, whom I mentioned in the introduction of this paper 
remembering Haba’s Dongba and even the town Lubu (the now extinct female 
shaman of the Dongba religion,) stated that she thinks Haba’s culture has changed a 
great deal. “Each generation has been different. And each generation after today will 
be different.”
126
 She sat in front of her daughter’s hostel, peeling garlic when I spoke 
to her. She wore the blue Liberation hat, a maroon sweater, a blue apron, and black 
slacks, in the style of Lijiang’s older Nakhi women. She did not wear a qixing yangpi, 
however, because it was very hot in Haba at the time, and she spent her days in the 
fields when she wasn’t assisting her daughter. I noticed that the qixing yangpis of 
Haba were quite different than those of the women in Lijiang, appearing woven, 
mostly without the seven stars, and with more brightly colorful weaving. I asked one 
woman about this difference, and she told me,“ We make ours ourselves. The women 






 Elderly Woman (Haba guesthouse employee) in discussion with the author. May 
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in Lijiang can buy one standard yangpi, but we can’t afford those.”
127
 As for other 
more drastic cultural differences and changes, she states,“We used to do dances in 
town, dances that no one remembers. Much of our most traditional culture has 
changed and been forgotten.”
128
  
She went on to tell me that she still owns and wears Nakhi traditional clothing 
for dancing that takes place on festival days, though the festival days that she named 
were May 1
st
, which is International Workers Day, a celebration of the international 
labor movement, and March 8
th
, or International Women’s Day, as well as the 
Chinese Spring Festival. These are holidays that are promoted by the Chinese state, 
and have very little, if anything, to do with traditional Nakhi celebrations, 
demonstrating, yet again, the extent to which the Nakhi have been absorbed into Han 
Chinese culture and under discourses of the state. But she did not speak of this 
cultural change or integration into Han culture with any semblance of regret. She just 
spoke about in a matter of fact manner, perhaps with a wistful tinge of memory, 
seeming, like many Nakhi people I spoke to, to support and accept these changes as 
necessary for the modernization of the Nakhi people.  
 I did, however, meet one man who was more vehemently opposed to cultural 
change and was a staunch supporter of cultural preservation. This man was the 
baoche driver from Qiaotou whom I mentioned above. He is eleventh generation 
Nakhi on his father’s side, has a Bai minority mother, and knew Nakhi history in 
more detail than anyone else I met in my time in and around Lijiang. He claimed, as 
stated in the early history section of this paper, that the Nakhi had originally settled in 
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Sanba, near Baishutai, and that the Lijiang Nakhi were people who had fled from a 
war between the Nakhi and another group. He went into great, frank detail about his 
opinion regarding the Nakhi of Lijiang: 
Nakhi in Lijiang do not speak proper Nakhi language. Their tones are very 
chaotic, and people here cannot understand a word they are saying. They also 
use many loan words from Chinese, like Chinese numbers. Many Nakhi in 
Lijiang have become like Han people, but that has been happening for a long 
time. For example, Mr. Xuan Ke’s orchestra in Lijiang Old Town plays 
ancient Han music, which shows that we Nakhi were becoming Han long ago. 
The Dongbas in Lijiang are not real. Dongba culture is alive and well in this 





His negative opinions of the chengshi Nakhi of Lijiang Old Town and his positive 
opinions of the shanqu Nakhi further reinforces the discourse of difference and 
authenticity that was discussed by Chao. Most Nakhi I met did not emphasize these 
differences, so it was interesting to hear this contrary point of view. And in many 
ways, he’s right. The Nakhi of Lijiang do borrow Chinese words on a daily basis, and 
do more closely resemble modern Han people than shanqu Nakhi. And his arguments 
about Dongba are undeniable. The Dongba of Lijiang is a performance for tourists, 
not an actual practice of the Nakhi spiritual tradition. He went on to say, quite 
pessimistically,“ Without cultural preservation and preservation of our languages, I 
think, in one hundred years, many of these more traditional cultures will have 
disappeared altogether,” lamenting Nakhi assimilation, as well as the assimilation of 
other minority nationalities. He was the first person I spoke to who had such a 
negative view of cultural assimilation and homogenization in Yunnan. It was 
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encouraging to know that, like the teachers in Baisha, traditional Nakhi culture still 
has some defenders, despite the Nakhi tradition of cultural adaptation.  
A Funeral in Daju 
 My next and final destination in my explorations of Nakhi culture’s links with 
development was a small, more isolated village called Daju. Daju, like Haba is 
located at the northern end of Tiger Leaping Gorge, but it is located on the opposite 
side of the Yangtze River from Haba, accessible only by a small ferryboat when 
approaching from the north. Daju is one of about twenty smaller villages located on a 
plateau that overlooks the river and the gorge to the south, positioned perpendicularly 
to the Jade Dragon Snow Mountain, an auspicious placement for its majority Nakhi 
population. I did not glean the same amount of demographic information while in 
Daju as in Nanyao and Haba, but the village is comprised almost solely of Nakhi and 
Han residents according to one guesthouse owner in town and his mother who works 
in his guesthouse. From what I observed, Daju was not as developed as Haba, but 
slightly more developed than Nanyao, though it was, no doubt a shanqu village. Daju 
attracts a large amount of tourists, Chinese and foreign, who hike Tiger Leaping 
Gorge, and has many guesthouses and other tourism infrastructures, including two 
daily buses that go directly to Lijiang from the town. Daju, however, does not have 
the same quality of roads and travel infrastructure that Nanyao and Haba have, and its 
people seem generally poorer, with most citizens being tobacco and wheat 
sharecroppers. As well, the people of Daju did not have the modern farm equipment 
that was common among the residents of Nanyao and some of the residents of Haba. 
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Plowing is done with cattle and water buffalo and planting is done almost entirely by 
hand.  
 My experience in Daju was also entirely unique as I was able to participate in 
a Nakhi funeral, an event that took up the majority of my time in the village and gave 
me a deep insight into surviving Nakhi cultural practice surrounding death and burial. 
The man who had died was an eighty-two year old, well-respected member of Daju’s 
Nakhi community. The man’s son told me,“ He was a common man, but everyone 
knew him. That is why everyone in the village is participating today.”
130
 I arrived at 
the funeral at the outset of the funeral procession that lead to the burial ground high 
above the village, nestled in a small grove of shrubs and trees. While Nakhi funerary 
proceedings are dominated by Nakhi men, observing these customs allowed me to 
better understand Nakhi women’s cultural expression during such events. 
 The procession began at the sight of the wake and banquet for the deceased 
with great fanfare and grief. Everyone participating wore white turban-like cloth hats, 
which is a Nakhi regional tradition. The women of the village exited the sight first 
wailing and crying uncontrollably. The bereaved women and two of the deceased 
man’s sons, also visibly, physically wracked with grief, knelt on the ground forming 
what is called a human bridge (ren qiao) over which the coffin must pass. This is a 
reference to Dongba mythology, where a Nakhi person’s soul must pass over a bridge 
of humans before being allowed entrance to the spirit world, a process that would also 
be officiated by a Dongba ritual practitioner were there still a man of such rank in 
Daju. The man’s son, surprisingly young, in his mid-forties, considering his deep 
knowledge of the necessary steps to ensure his father’s safe and correct passing, 
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instead, performed the role of the Dongba. Erik Mueggler summarizes the processes 
of the funeral procession, stating: 
A funeral procession made up entirely of men accompanies the coffin from 
[the main square of the village] to its burial site on the mountain; the 
deceased’s eldest male descendent, the guide, walks in front of the coffin with 
a bamboo branch and two skin bags of food for the deceased and a crowd of 
male kin trail in its wake…[T]he female kin gather before the coffin arrives, 
the deceased’s sisters, daughters, and wife kneeling on straw…As the bearers 
carry the coffin over the heads of the kneeling women they collapse on the 
ground, thrashing their arms and legs, wailing their kinship designation for the 
deceased and stories of their past experience with him or her…[Other] 
women…rush to the center and hold the wailing women down, and then, 
supporting them by the arms, guide them [away]…After the coffin has passed 





This was the scene that I witnessed in Daju as well, with a few tweaks. Two of the 
sons of the dead man were included in the ren qiao, a bag made of the husks of a 
local plant replaced the skin bags, and there was no straw on which the women could 
kneel. As well, the funeral procession began from the house of the deceased where 
the wake had been held, not from a central square.  
 After the passing of the ren qiao, the women’s role is significantly diminished 
in the procession. Men participating in the procession informed me,“ Women have 
small hearts. They will worry,”
132
 alluding to a gendered discourse within Nakhi 
beliefs related to death that Meuggler also discovered when speaking to a Nakhi 
informant who told him,“ ‘Women cry easily, and people here believe that if anyone 
cries while burying the coffin, the dead person will have bad luck in the other world. 
This is a superstition.’ Later, when the coffin was being buried, the same man said, 
                                                 
131
 Mueggler, Erik. “Money, the Mountain, and State Power in a Naxi Village.” 
Modern China. Vol. 17. No. 2. 1991: 220-221. 
132
 Nakhi man participating in funeral procession (Daju) in discussion with the author. 
May 2013.  
63 
‘’See how everyone is cheerful and some are laughing? This is out of respect for the 
dead.’”
133
 The men in Daju also laughed, smiled, and were generally jovial while 
escorting their deceased comrade to his final resting place. Women did, however, 
have one more role in the procession, which seemed to be of great import. This was to 
give offerings to the dead man and to the men in the funeral procession along the road 
before the men passed the limits of the village. The offerings were simple, mostly 
comprised of small snacks, fruit, alcohol, flowers, cigarettes, and tea, as well as the 
burning of incense and the bowing of heads as the coffin passed. The men would stop 
briefly, take what they wanted and then continue on their way to the mountain. The 
women would stand by the road, solemn faced, trays of cigarettes in hand before the 
procession passed, after which they would return to the banquet area to prepare the 
food for the mid-day meal and dinner. There were three such places where women 
made offerings of this kind before the procession became a solely male affair.  
I saw the women’s role as the bearers and performers of grief in this process 
of burial to be yet another manifestation of Nakhi women’s bitter lot and their role of 
self-sacrifice for the community. Women were expected to voice grief and physically 
display that grief for the greater good of the community, so that men could keep their 
emotional reaction to death to themselves and properly perform the burial. By 
sacrificing their usually strong, stoic countenances, the Nakhi women of Daju 
facilitated the passing of a man into the next world, while upholding this age-old 
tradition.  
When the Nakhi men and I had completed the burial on the mountainside, 
having made sure the man’s coffin was properly aligned with the Jade Dragon Snow 
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Mountain, and spent much time sitting and laughing together over bottles of beer and 
soda and cigarettes, we descended back into the village for the dual meal banquet. 
When we arrived, after having washed our hands of the earth and walking over a 
cleansing fire of ferns, removing the weighty essence of death from our bodies, we 
were greeted by bright eyed women serving full plates of meat, fish, vegetables, 
mushrooms, and tofu, as well as healthy servings of local white liquor and Dali beer. 
Men and women ate at separate tables, but everyone was happily exchanging stories 
of the deceased man and simply recounting the events of the day. Older Nakhi 
women sat around the edges of the banquet talking among themselves in hushed tones, 
matriarchs mourning the passing and celebrating the life of a patriarch and making 
plans for the future of their village. The meals soon ended, and the women of the 
village, having set up a stereo system, began to dance. These were not traditional 
dances, but they were dances that included the whole community that were set to 
Nakhi pop music and songs of the day. Men watched the women dance while 
smoking cigarettes and pipes, drinking beer, and talking the night away. The women 
danced in a circle, hand in hand, across generations, and celebrated the life of a man 
who had had great significance to all. 
Conclusions 
 I saw this funeral, like the Nakhi, not simply as the passing of a man but also 
as the passing of bygone time and a bygone culture. However, like the Nakhi of Daju, 
I saw this passing is not cause for endless mourning and lamentation, but as a cause 
for the celebration of what is to come. As an older Nakhi man is committed to the 
ground, so to are the traditional knowledge and a traditional way of life that has 
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guided the Nakhi people to their current status as a respectable and lively national 
minority of China. Although this passing is cause for worry, the entrance of new 
cultural components of Nakhi culture and further integration of the Nakhi into 
Chinese national culture and modern culture is cause for celebration. 
 In my discussion with the Chairwoman of the Yu Long County Women’s 
Federation, she said something that has resonated with me on a deep level,“ We 
Nakhi are not han hua, we have become quan qiu hua,” a phrase that roughly 
translates to assimilated into global culture, and this is a very profound affirmation of 
the current state of Nakhi culture for Nakhi women and for Nakhi people as a 
whole.
134
 Because of the Nakhi’s history of cultural assimilation by necessity, they 
have ascended, within Chinese state and indigenous Nakhi discourses, to a modern 
level of development that will allow them to survive as a people. While certain 
aspects of Nakhi culture have been lost to the winds of change and modernization, 
and there have indeed been missteps along this path as manifested in Lijiang Old 
Town’s questionable representation of the Nakhi people, Nakhi culture still survives 
as obviously distinct from that of the Han Chinese. The Nakhi are a resilient people, 
always ready to make the changes within their society that need to be made, and this 
will not change, though the form of their culture will undoubtedly be reshaped.   
 External forces have formed the Nakhi, but this has been a voluntary process 
of change. The Nakhi have done away with some traditions, such as Dongba and 
certain parts of their old society, but this doing away was purposeful and imperative, 
especially during the Mao Era. Through the internalization of imperial and state 
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discourses, the Nakhi made themselves in the image of the Chinese ideals that 
surrounded them, but mostly through the efforts of their women, have retained a great 
deal. The Nakhi speak their own language. The Nakhi are again learning to write their 
own unique pictographic script. The Nakhi have their own, deep-seated constructions 
of gender that will not likely change. And Nakhi women have their own ideas of what 
a woman’s role in society should be, informed by the ideal physically represented in 
the qixing yangpi.  
 These aspects of Nakhi culture should be aggressively preserved, and there are 
Nakhi people, like the teachers in Baisha and Nanyao and the baoche driver in 
Qiaotou, who are giving voice to this cry for preservation. Changes should be made to 
the efforts to preserve these intrinsically Nakhi ideals, as many efforts being made at 
the moment in places like Old Town are insufficient and exploitative of Nakhi 
difference, but these changes will likely come from the Nakhi themselves. Lijiang 
Old Town is an unsustainable nightmare in terms of cultural preservation, but, soon, 
the Nakhi will realize this, likely when tourist numbers coming to Lijiang begin to 
shrink as a result of the poor strategies in use today, and the Nakhi will adapt as they 
always have.  
I believe that if the Nakhi turn cultural preservation efforts over to the people 
who have become the representatives of Nakhi culture within China, Nakhi women, 
then this preservation will be accomplished more effectively. If Nakhi women are 
educated in their own language and history, which is just now beginning to happen 
again in the post-Mao Era, then Nakhi culture that the Nakhi wish to preserve has a 
fighting chance. Nakhi women today are not only the representatives of their culture 
67 
due to Nakhi discourses of gendered authenticity, but the most steadfast hope for the 
future of this culture. Nakhi women own Nakhi culture, now the Nakhi just have to 
allow women to be the arbiters of its preservation by giving them the necessary tools 
of education and empowerment. I have hope for the future of the Nakhi in and around 
Lijiang, but they will have to wake up to the problematic nature of the current status 
quo and invent new discourses that allow them to ensure the survival of those cultural 
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Appendix 2: Interview Questions 
 
1. Where are you from? 
70 
 
2. Are your father and mother both Nakhi? 
a. Is your whole family Nakhi? 
 
3. How long have you lived here? 
a. What is your occupation? 
 
4. What cultural differences are there between shanqu Nakhi and chengshi Nakhi? 
 
5. What is your religion? 
a. What connection do you have to Dongba? 
b. What traditional Nakhi ceremonies do you practice? 
c. Do you know any Nakhi legends or Nakhi history? 
 
6. What language do you use in everyday life? 
a. Did you study Nakhi in school or did you learn it at home? 
 
7. Do you wear traditional Nakhi clothes? 
a. When do you wear them? 
 
8. In your family, who has a job? Who has the highest income? 
 
9. Do Nakhi women still practice the qixing labor ideal?  
 
a. What differences are there between young Nakhi women and older 
Nakhi women? 
 
10. What is your opinion of the development of Lijiang and Lijiang Old Town? 
a. In your opinion, how has this development changed Nakhi culture? 
 
Appendix 3: Subjective Experience 
 
The most interesting experience I had during my time researching this topic 
was, far and away, my participation in the funeral in Daju village. If you are trying to 
study the Nakhi and want to better understand their culture and gender roles, then you 
should try you best to attend a Nakhi funeral or a Nakhi wedding. These events are 
two of the few times in Nakhi life that are still steeped in more traditional Nakhi 
culture. The Nakhi were always very open towards me, and were happy to have me 
participate in the event, so don’t worry about being shunned from such ceremonies. 
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Just be respectful, follow your respective gender role (these were clearly very 
important at the funeral,) and Nakhi people will likely welcome you with open arms. 
Be prepared to drink though. I was seeing double by the end of the night after all the 
toasts that people made with me. Baijiu is a cruel mistress of an alcohol, believe me 
you. 
 
